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Abstract
We replicate the essentials of the Huettel et al. (2006) experiment on choice
under uncertainty with 30 Yale undergraduates, where subjects make 200 pairwise choices between risky and ambiguous lotteries. Inferences about the independence of economic preferences for risk and ambiguity are derived from
estimation of a mixed logit model, where the choice probabilities are functions
of two random eﬀects: the proxies for risk-aversion and ambiguity-aversion.
Our principal empirical finding is that we cannot reject the null hypothesis
that risk and ambiguity are independent in economic choice under uncertainty.
This finding is consistent with the hypothesized independence of the neural mechanisms governing economic choices under risk and ambiguity, suggested by the
double dissociation-fMRI study reported in Huettel et al.
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Introduction

Knight and Keynes in their classic monographs oﬀer two independent but overlapping
discussions of estimating probabilities for decision-making under risk and uncertainty.
In this regard Keynes is probably best known for his chapter on “The state of long-run
expectation” in The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (1936) and
Knight for his chapter on “The meaning of risk and uncertainty” in Risk, Uncertainty
and Profit (1921). A central contribution in the cited works of Knight and Keynes is
the distinction between risk and uncertainty. Here is a quotation from Keynes (1937):
By uncertain knowledge, let me explain, I do not mean merely to distinguish what is known for certain from what is only probable. The game of
roulette is not subject, in this sense, to uncertainty; nor is the prospect
of a Victory bond being drawn. Or, again, the expectation of life is only
slightly uncertain. Even the weather is only moderately uncertain. The
sense in which I am using the term is that in which the prospect of a
European war is uncertain, or the price of copper and the rate of interest
twenty years hence, or the obsolescence of a new invention, or the position
of private wealth owners in the social system in 1970. About these matters there is no scientific basis on which to form any calculable probability
whatever. We simply do not know.
This distinction is absent in the expected utility ( ) model of decision-making
under risk, due to von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), and Savage’s (1954) model
of decision-making under uncertainty, but it is the genesis of Ellsberg’s (1961) seminal
critique of Savage’s theory of subjective expected utility ( ). In his analysis,
Ellsberg proposes ambiguity or “irreducible uncertainty” as it is called by Keynes, as
another aspect of decision-making under uncertainty. In Ellsberg’s two-color thought
experiment, subjects make pair-wise choices between a risky urn, where the relative
frequencies of the two outcomes are 1/2, and an ambiguous urn, where the relative
frequencies are unknown. In the first trial, if the subject chooses an urn and draws
a black ball then she receives $100, the “good” outcome, but if she draws a white
ball then she receives zero dollars, the “bad outcome.” In the second trial the payoﬀs
are reversed. Subjects that choose the ambiguous urn on both trials are said to be
ambiguity-seeking and subjects that choose the risky urn on both trials are said to be
ambiguity-averse. Ambiguity-seeking subjects in the Ellsberg experiment “act as if,”
the perceived probability of the “good” outcome is greater than the relative frequency
of the “good” outcome. Ambiguity-averse subjects in the Ellsberg experiment “act
as if” the perceived probability of the “bad” outcome is greater than the relative
frequency of the “bad” outcome.
The dependence of perceived probabilities on payoﬀs is inconsistent with Savage’s
axiomatic model of decision-making under uncertainty, i.e., subjective expected utility
( ) theory. See Savage, page 68: “... the view sponsored here does not leave
room for optimism or pessimism to play any role in the person’s judgement,” or
Ellsberg’s (1961) explanation of the two color Ellsberg paradox: “... we would have
2

to regard the subject’s subjective probabilities as being dependent upon his payoﬀs,
his evaluation of the outcomes ... it is impossible to infer from the resulting behavior
a set of probabilities for events independent of his payoﬀs.”
In an interesting and provocative experiment, Huettel et al. (2006) test a new
model of decision-making under uncertainty with proxies for risk-aversion and ambiguityaversion, consistent with Ellsberg’s explanation of the two color Ellsberg paradox,
where agents choose actions and beliefs. The proxies are  for risk-aversion, where
 is the coeﬃcient of relative risk-aversion for the utility function () =  , and 
for ambiguity-aversion in the -max min expected utility model. The -max min expected utility of an ambiguous lottery,  = (1  2 ) is (1 − )(1 ∨ 2 ) + (1 ∧ 2 ).
If  ∈ (0 1) then  is concave and the subject is risk-averse. If  = 1 then  is linear
and the subject is risk-neutral. Finally, if   1 then  is convex and the subject
is risk-loving. Huettel et al. interpret  as a measure of ambiguity-aversion, where
 ∈ [0 05) denotes ambiguity-seeking,  = 05 is ambiguity-neutral, and  ∈ (05 1]
denotes ambiguity-averse. The utility of an ambiguous lottery in the Huettel et
al. model is the -max min expected utility and the utility of a risky lottery is the
expected utility. Huettel et al. assume that subjects maximize utility in choosing between a pair of lotteries. Before reviewing their experiment, we show that the Huettel
et al. model is consistent with Ellsberg’s explanation of the two-color paradox. The
utility of the risky urn is [(0) +  (100)]2 and the utility of the ambiguous urn
is (1 − )(100) + (0), where (0) = 0. If the agent is ambiguity-averse then
(1 − ) ∈ [0 05). Hence  (100) 2  (1 − )(100) and the agent chooses the risky
urn on both trials. If the agent is ambiguity-seeking then (1 − ) ∈ (05 1]. Hence
 (100) 2  (1 − )(100) and the agent chooses the ambiguous urn on both trials.
Returning to the experiment of Huettel et al. Using    data from pairwise
choices between risky lotteries, where the probabilities of the payoﬀs are known to the
subjects, and ambiguous lotteries, where the probabilities of the payoﬀs are unknown
to the subjects, Huettel et al. conclude that the neural mechanisms governing choice
under risk and choice under ambiguity are independent. Briefly, they asked 13 subjects to make pair-wise choices between lotteries with diﬀerent degrees of uncertainty,
i.e., certain, risky and ambiguous, and used the    data to identify regions in the
brain that are activated during the choice process. For each subject,  is estimated to
maximize the number of correct predictions in the risky-risky and risky-certain trials,
using the expected utility model. The   data identified a region of the brain
b
that is activated during the choice process, call it region  Given the estimated ,
 for each subject is estimated to maximize the number of correct predictions in the
ambiguous-risky and ambiguous-certain trials , using the -max min expected utility
model. The   data identified a diﬀerent region of the brain that is activated
during this choice process, call it region . Moreover,  is inactive when  is active
and  is inactive when  is inactive. As is common in the neural science literature,
this double dissociation  study is interpreted as independence of the two choice
behaviors.
Unfortunately, the estimation procedure in the Huettel et al. study is not identified, i.e., there are several values of  and  that maximize the number of correct
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predictions – see the sub-section on Behavioral Data Acquisition and Analysis in
the section on Procedures in Huettel et al. Recently, Levy et al. (2010) oﬀered an
alternative explanation of the hypothesized finding of diﬀerential activation in parts
of the brain as a consequence of choice under risk and ambiguity. In the Huettel et
al. study subjects were told, ex post, the probabilities defining ambiguous lotteries,
possibly allowing learning of the ambiguous probabilities. In the Levy et al. study,
where subjects were not told the ambiguous probabilities, the levels of neural activation resulting from choice under risk and ambiguity were comparable. Given the
limitations of the Huettel et al. study, in determining the independence of economic
preferences for risk and ambiguity, it is important to replicate their experiment and
estimate  and  with an econometric model that is identified, using an experimental
design, as in Levy et al., where subjects are not told the ambiguous probabilities.
To that end, we recast the Huettel et al. model as a random utility model, more
specifically a mixed logit model. The mixed logit model allows us to estimate a
bivariate distribution over  and  from pair-wise choices between risky and ambiguous lotteries of subjects randomly selected from the population. The random utility
model was first proposed in psychology by Thurstone (1927) in a form now called
the binomial probit model, and subsequently introduced in economics by Marschak
(1960) who investigated the properties of choice probabilities for utility functions
subject to random perturbations. McFadden (1974) introduced the conditional logit
model. In the binomial case, this is the well-studied logistic model in biostatistics.
See McFadden’s Nobel Lecture for a brief history of the origins of the random utility
model.
The proxies for ambiguity-aversion and risk-aversion,  and , are treated as
random eﬀects, i.e., random variables uncorrelated with the explanatory variables, in
the mixed logit model presented in this paper. For a detailed discussion of the mixed
logit model see chapter 6 of Train (2009). The following example from McCulloch et
al. (2008) illustrates the diﬀerences between fixed and random eﬀects:
Consider a clinical trial to treat epileptics, in which a drug is administered
at four diﬀerent dose levels.  is the number of seizures experienced by
patient  receiving dose , where [ ] =  +  ,  is a general mean
and  is the eﬀect on the number of seizures due to treatment . In this
model of the expected value of  ,  and each  are considered fixed
and unknown constants, that we wish to estimate. These are the only
treatments being used and we are considering no others, thus the  are
fixed eﬀects.
Suppose now the clinical trials were conducted at 20 diﬀerent clinics in
New York City, where  is the number of seizures experienced by patient
 receiving treatment at the  the clinic. Now [ ] =  +  . The clinics
have been chosen randomly with the object of treating them as a representation of the population of all clinics in New York City and inferences
can and will be made about that population. This is characteristic of
random eﬀects, thus the  are random eﬀects.
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There are two criteria for using a random eﬀects model in lieu of a fixed eﬀects
model. First, the data is generated by taking a random sample from some fixed
population. Our sample is randomly selected from the population of Yale students,
matriculating in the summer session and fall term of 2009. Second, the explanatory
variables – the payoﬀs and probabilities defining the lotteries — must be uncorrelated
with the random eﬀects,  and  This is certainly true in our experiment in which
the payoﬀs and probabilities defining the lotteries in the pair-wise comparisons are
generated randomly and independently for each subject.
We replicate the essentials of the Huettel et al. experiment with 30 randomly
chosen Yale undergraduates. One modification is that we asked the subjects to make
some pairwise comparisons between ambiguous lotteries – this was not the case
in the Huettel et al. experiment. In our experiment, each subject makes 200 pairwise choices between risky and ambiguous lotteries. In the Huettel et al. analysis,
 and  are interpreted as parameters and the choice probability,  , for  in the
pair-wise comparison between lotteries  and  is defined as the percent correctly
predicted. This is not the case for the mixed logit model that we present. In our
model, the choice probability,  , for  in the pairwise choices between lotteries
 and  is interpreted as the proportion of individuals in the population, with
the same preferences for risk and ambiguity, that choose  or is interpreted as the
proportion of times that a single individual chooses  in repeated pairwise choices
between options  and  . This is our other modification of the Huettel et al.
experiment.
We interpret  and  as random eﬀects with a bivariate log-normal distribution,
parameterized by unknown hyper-parameters Ψ. Using the Bayesian perspective,
we can first estimate Ψ by simulated maximum likelihood and then estimate the
individual random eﬀects  and   for each subject  = 1 2  30, by simulating the
posterior distribution of  and   conditional on the subject’s pair-wise comparisons
of risky and ambiguous lotteries, using Bayes theorem. The posterior means are
consistent estimates of the individual-level random eﬀects,  and   – see chapter
11 of Train (2009) for the details. The Bernstein—von Mises theorem in chapter
12 of Train provides an alternative classical method of estimating the individuallevel random eﬀects. That is, maximum likelihood estimation of  and   . The
Bernstein—von Mises theorem shows that the Bayesian and classical estimates of the
individual-level random eﬀects  and   are asymptotically equivalent.
We estimate  and   by maximizing the log-likelihood of each subject’s pairwise choices in risky and ambiguous lotteries. Following Huettel et al., we use a
two-step procedure to estimate  and   for each subject  = 1 2  30 That is,
our estimator is two-step maximum likelihood estimation. To estimate   , we ask
each subject to choose between 40 risky-certain pairs and 40 risky-risky pairs of
lotteries. Here we assume that each subject is maximizing expected utility, which
only depends on   . To estimate  , we ask each subject to choose between 40
ambiguous-certain pairs and 40 pairs of ambiguous-ambiguous lotteries. Here we
assume that each subject is maximizing -max min expected utility, which depends
on both  and   , where we use the previously estimated value of   and need only
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estimate  . It is well known that these estimates are consistent under the standard
conditions for maximum likelihood estimation, but any standard estimator of the
asymptotic covariance matrix for asymptotic normality of the maximum likelihood
estimate of  requires a correction. For specifics, see Theorem 17.8 in Greene (2003)
due to Murphy and Topel (1985). This correction is not necessary under the null
hypothesis that ambiguity and risk are statistically independent.
Treating these estimates as realizations of the random variables  and , we examine the correlation, , between  and  by regressing  on . Despite the limitations
of the study reported in Huettel et al. cited above, our results are consistent with their
hypothesized finding on economic preferences for risk and ambiguity, that the neural
processes governing choice under risk are independent of the neural processes governing choice under ambiguity. That is, we cannot reject the reject the null hypothesis
that  = 0 at the 5% significance level.

2

The Mixed Logit Model

To replicate the essentials of the Huettel et al. experiment, we consider pair-wise
choices in 200 monetary gambles made by 30 randomly chosen Yale undergraduates
in 2009. As in the Huettel et al. experiment, each lottery involves choices between
a known payoﬀ, payoﬀs with known probabilities, and payoﬀs with unknown probabilities. We refer to these lotteries as certain, risky and ambiguous lotteries, respectively. In our experiment, each subject chooses between 40 risky-certain pairs,
40 risky-risky pairs, 40 ambiguous-certain pairs, 40 ambiguous-ambiguous pairs and
40 risky-ambiguous pairs. All ambiguous lotteries have two positive payoﬀs and all
certain lotteries have one positive payoﬀ. In the risky-certain pairs and the riskyrisky pairs, all risky lotteries have one zero payoﬀ and one positive payoﬀ, but in the
risky-ambiguous pairs both ambiguous and risky lotteries have two positive payoﬀs.
Expected values of lotteries are chosen as random, whole-dollar amounts between
$5 and $25, and expected values of pairs of lotteries are matched within 20%. The
probability of winning the amount presented in a certain lottery is always 1, and
the probabilities of winning amounts presented in risky and ambiguous lotteries are
chosen randomly between 0.25 and 0.75, and varied across gambles.
At the start of each trial, subjects are given a pair-wise choice between lotteries,
represented by two pie charts. Subjects are instructed to choose the lottery on the
left or right by typing “” or “.” Once a choice is made, a box appears around the
chosen lottery and the other lottery disappears. Finally, the payoﬀ of the lottery is
displayed at the bottom of the screen. Figure 1 displays pairs of risky, certain and
ambiguous lotteries. After completion of 200 trials, subjects are paid winnings from
4 randomly selected trials. Winnings ranged from $0 to $93 in a single trial, and $35
to $99 overall. The results of the experiment are summarized in the appendix. Ex
post, subjects are not told the probability of outcomes in an ambiguous lottery.
Here is a brief description of the parametric mixed logit models we use to analyze
our data. For each pair of risky lotteries:  ≡ (1  2 ;  1   2 ) and  ≡ (1  2 ;  1  2 ),
 is the probability of choosing , and  is the probability of choosing  in a pair6

Trial Types
Risky – Certain

Ambiguous – Certain
$0

$8
$

$12

$12

?

$20

$35

Risky – Risky

Ambiguous – Risky
$0

$4

$10
$20

$12

?

$50

$20
$35

Ambiguous – Ambiguous
$0

$15

?

?
$35

$20

Figure 1. Experimental Design
(A) Subjects made decisions between pairs of gambles, drawn from
the following types: certain, with a known outcome; risky, with two
outcomes with known probabilities; and ambiguous, with two
outcomes with unknown probabilities. Probabilities and reward
values varied across trials, and expected value was roughly
matched between the gambles.
(B) At the beginning of each trial, two gambles were presented and
the subjects indicated their preference by pressing a joystick
button. A square then appeared around the selected gamble.

wise comparison between  and  , where  +  = 1.
To estimate , we use the multiplicative random utility model, where the expected
utility of the risky option  is given by
 () =  1 (1 ) +  2 (2 ) 
The logit choice probability for choosing ,  (), is defined by the logistic cdf
Λ[] ≡

exp 
1 + exp 

That is,
 () ≡

exp[ln  ()− ln  ( )]

(1 + exp [ ln  ()− ln  ( )])

– see Fosgerau and Bielaire (2009) for a discussion of the multiplicative random
utility model. In our data set, the pairs of risky-certain and risky-risky lotteries,
2 = 2 = 0. Hence the logit choice probability for choosing  as a function of  is
 () =

exp[ ln (1 )+ ln  1 − ln ( 1 ) − ln  1 ]

(1 + exp[ ln (1 )+ ln  1 −  ln ( 1 ) − ln  1 ])

We denote the chosen lotteries as   in each pair of 40 risky-certain and 40 riskyrisky lotteries. The likelihood of the observed risky choices in the 80 pair-wise
comparisons{(     )}=80
=1 as a function of  is
−80
Y

  ()

=1

The log-likelihood
=80
1 X
ln   ()
80
=1

=

1
80

=80
X
=1

ln(exp[ ln (1 )+ ln  1 − ln ( 1 )− ln  1 ]

(1 + exp[ ln (1 )+ ln  1 −  ln ( 1 ) − ln 1 ]))



McFadden has shown that the log-likelihood function with these choice probabilities is globally concave in . Hence the   for ̂ is identified. We estimate ̂ by
numerically maximizing the log-likelihood of the logit choice probabilities.
Our null hypothesis is that economic preferences for risk and ambiguity are independent, where  is a measure of the subject’s tolerance for risk and  is a measure of
the subject’s attitude towards ambiguity. The alternative hypothesis is that economic
preferences for risk and ambiguity are correlated. Under the null hypothesis, every
function of  and every function of  are independent. In particular, the  for 
and risky-certain or risky-risky data is independent of the  for  and ambiguouscertain or ambiguous-ambiguous data, for every fixed value of , e.g., ̂, the estimate
of .
7

To estimate , we use the additive random utility model, where subjects evaluate
ambiguous lotteries, using -max min expected utility. Given the pair of ambiguous
lotteries  ≡ (1  2 ) and  ≡ (1  2 ), the logit choice probability for choosing 
as a function of , for fixed ̂, is
 ( ̂) =

exp{[(1 ∧2 )̂ +(1−)(1 ∨2 )̂ ]−[(1 ∧2 )̂ +(1−)(1 ∨2 )̂ ]}
[1+exp{[(1 ∧2 )̂ +(1−)(1 ∨2 )̂ ]−[(1 ∧2 )̂ +(1−)(1 ∨2 )̂ ]}

– see Train (2009) for a discussion of the additive random utility model. We denote
the chosen lotteries as   in each pair of 40 ambiguous-certain and 40 ambiguousambiguous lotteries. The likelihood of the observed ambiguous choices in the 80
pair-wise comparisons {(     )}=80
=1 as a function of , for fixed ̂, is
=80
Y

  ( ̂)

=1

The log-likelihood
=80
1 X
ln   ( ̂)
80
=1

=

1
80

=80
X
=1

ln exp{[(1 ∧2 )̂ +(1−)(1 ∨2 )̂ ]−[(1 ∧2 )̂ +(1−)(1 ∨2 )̂ ]}

[1+exp{[(1 ∧2 )̂ +(1−)(1 ∨2 )̂ ]−[(1 ∧2 )̂ +(1−)(1 ∨2 )̂ ]}

If ̂ 6= 0, then the log-likelihood function is globally concave in , ̂ is not
identified for subjects where ̂ = 0. That is, if ̂ = 0, then for all ̂ ∈ [0 1] :
  (̂ ̂) = 12. Hence ̂ is indeterminate and the six subjects with indeterminate
̂ “act as if” they flip a fair coin to choose between any pair of ambiguous lotteries.
These 6 subjects were excluded from our analysis. The   for  is identified
for the remaining 24 subjects. We estimate ̂ for each of these 24 subjects with
the 40 ambiguous-certain and the 40 ambiguous-ambiguous lotteries, by numerically
maximizing the log-likelihood of the logit choice probabilities, for fixed ̂.
To estimate the correlation between risk and ambiguity, we consider several specifications. In the five specifications, where we exclude the six subjects with unidentified
̂, the slope coeﬃcient of the regression is not significantly diﬀerent from 0 at the 0.05
level, indicating linear independence between risk and ambiguity. Hence we cannot
reject the null hypothesis of independence of economic preferences for risk and ambiguity. The regression coeﬃcients, regression statistics and confidence intervals are in
the appendix on parametric data analysis. All the statistical and numerical analysis
was done with Matlab. This empirical finding only shows that risk aversion and ambiguity aversion are not linearly dependent. Hence we test directly for independence
by constructing a 2 × 2 contingency table, where the columns are labeled , for
ambiguity aversion and , for ambiguity seeking,and the rows are labeled , for
risk averse, and  , for risk seeking. Here is the table, where we have omitted the
6 subjects with unidentified ̂:
8





5
19


0
0

We see that the cells in the second column are both zero. Consequently, Prob(|) =
Prob(|) = 1. Hence in our choice experiment it follows from Fisher’s exact test
that risk and ambiguity are independent – see section 4.6 in Lehmann and Romano
(2005).
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Appendix: Data Analysis
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Estimation Results
•

Beta measures risk-attitude.
o Beta < 1: risk-averse.
o Beta > 1: risk-seeking.

•

Alpha measures ambiguity-attitude.
o Alpha < 0.5: ambiguity-seeking.
o Alpha > 0.5: ambiguity-averse.

Subject No.

Beta

Alpha

1

0.8846

risk-averse

0.8031

2

0

risk-averse

0
ambiguity-seeking
indeterminate

3

1.0600

risk-seeking

0.6750

ambiguity-averse

4

1.6342

risk-seeking

0.8210

ambiguity-averse

5

0

risk-averse

0
ambiguity-seeking
indeterminate

6

1.1975

risk-seeking

0.8007

ambiguity-averse

7

1.8955

risk-seeking

0.8504

ambiguity-averse

8

0.4385

risk-averse

1.0000

ambiguity-averse

9

2.6677

risk-seeking

0.7104

ambiguity-averse

10

1.2111

risk-seeking

0.7788

ambiguity-averse

11

2.7591

risk-seeking

0.8493

ambiguity-averse

12

0

risk-averse

0
ambiguity-seeking
indeterminate

13

2.8378

risk-seeking

0.7460

ambiguity-averse

ambiguity-averse

Subject No.

Beta

Alpha

14

1.9467

risk-seeking

0.8322

ambiguity-averse

15

2.0150

risk-seeking

0.8966

ambiguity-averse

16

1.5265

risk-seeking

0.7113

ambiguity-averse

17

2.8376

risk-seeking

0.8056

ambiguity-averse

18

0.7023

risk-averse

0.8883

ambiguity-averse

19

2.9604

risk-seeking

0.8521

ambiguity-averse

20

1.3524

risk-seeking

0.8067

ambiguity-averse

21

0.4946

risk-averse

1.0000

ambiguity-averse

22

0

risk-averse

0
ambiguity-seeking
indeterminate

23

0.7039

risk-averse

0.9863

ambiguity-averse

24

1.8134

risk-seeking

0.8421

ambiguity-averse

25

2.0643

risk-seeking

0.9536

ambiguity-averse

26

2.3418

risk-seeking

0.8417

ambiguity-averse

27

1.6675

risk-seeking

0.8341

ambiguity-averse

28

1.5246

risk-seeking

0.8102

ambiguity-averse

29

0

risk-averse

0
ambiguity-seeking
indeterminate

30

0

risk-averse

0
ambiguity-seeking
indeterminate

Summary Excluding Subjects with Zero Beta
•

6 subjects excluded because their beta is zero.

•

24 out of remaining 24 individuals are ambiguity-averse.

•

Out of 24 ambiguity-averse individuals:
o 5 individuals are risk-averse and ambiguity-averse
o 19 individuals are risk-seeking and ambiguity-averse

Regression Analysis
Scenario I a: Regression Analysis Including Subjects with Zero Beta
LHS: alpha, RHS: constant, beta
Regression Coefficients (constant, beta)
0.3629
0.2272
95 % Confidence Intervals
•
•

Each row contains the left and right endpoint of the 95% confidence
interval for the corresponding coefficient.
If zero is inside the confidence interval, the coefficient is not significantly
different from zero.

0.1849
0.1196

0.5409
0.3347

Regression Statistics (R-squared, F-test, p-value for F-test)
•
•

F-test: Null hypothesis states that both regression coefficients equal zero.
Null hypothesis rejected at 95% level if p less than 0.05.

0.4008 18.7285

0.0002

Scenario I b: Regression Analysis Including Subjects with Zero Beta
LHS: beta, RHS: constant, alpha
Regression Coefficients (constant, alpha)
0.1693
1.7644
95 % Confidence Intervals
•
•

Each row contains the left and right endpoint of the 95% confidence
interval for the corresponding coefficient.
If zero is inside the confidence interval, the coefficient is not significantly
different from zero.

-0.4593
0.9293

0.7980
2.5996

Regression Statistics (R-squared, F-test, p-value for F-test)
•
•

F-test: Null hypothesis states that both regression coefficients equal zero.
Null hypothesis rejected at 95% level if p less than 0.05.

0.4008 18.7285

0.0002

Scenario II a: Regression Analysis Excluding Subjects with Zero Beta
LHS: alpha, RHS: constant, beta
Regression Coefficients (constant, beta)
0.9047
-0.0399
95 % Confidence Intervals
•
•

Each row contains the left and right endpoint of the 95% confidence
interval for the corresponding coefficient.
If zero is inside the confidence interval, the coefficient is not significantly
different from zero.

0.8195
-0.0859

0.9898
0.0061

Regression Statistics (R-squared, F-test, p-value for F-test)
•
•

F-test: Null hypothesis states that both regression coefficients equal zero.
Null hypothesis rejected at 95% level if p less than 0.05.

0.1281

3.2320

0.0860

Scenario II b: Regression Analysis Excluding Subjects with Zero Beta
LHS: beta, RHS: constant, alpha
Regression Coefficients (constant, alpha)
4.3791
-3.2127
95 % Confidence Intervals
•
•

Each row contains the left and right endpoint of the 95% confidence
interval for the corresponding coefficient.
If zero is inside the confidence interval, the coefficient is not significantly
different from zero.

1.2602
-6.9188

7.4980
0.4934

Regression Statistics (R-squared, F-test, p-value for F-test)
•
•

F-test: Null hypothesis states that both regression coefficients equal zero.
Null hypothesis rejected at 95% level if p less than 0.05.

0.1281

3.2320

0.0860

Scenario III a: Regression Analysis of Log-Representation Excluding
Subjects with Beta = 0 and Alpha = 1
LHS: log(alpha/(1-alpha)), RHS: constant, log(beta)
Regression Coefficients (constant, log(beta))
1.9250
-0.5002
95 % Confidence Intervals
•
•

Each row contains the left and right endpoint of the 95% confidence
interval for the corresponding coefficient.
If zero is inside the confidence interval, the coefficient is not significantly
different from zero.

1.4139
-1.2746

2.4360
0.2743

Regression Statistics (R-squared, F-test, p-value for F-test)
•
•

F-test: Null hypothesis states that both regression coefficients equal zero.
Null hypothesis rejected at 95% level if p less than 0.05.

0.0832

1.8149

0.1930

Scenario III b: Regression Analysis of Log-Representation Excluding
Subjects with Beta = 0 and Alpha = 1
LHS: log(beta), RHS: constant, log(alpha/(1-alpha))
Regression Coefficients (constant, log(alpha/(1-alpha))
0.7826
-0.1663
95 % Confidence Intervals
•
•

Each row contains the left and right endpoint of the 95% confidence
interval for the corresponding coefficient.
If zero is inside the confidence interval, the coefficient is not significantly
different from zero.

0.3118
-0.4239

1.2535
0.0912

Regression Statistics (R-squared, F-test, p-value for F-test)
•
•

F-test: Null hypothesis states that both regression coefficients equal zero.
Null hypothesis rejected at 95% level if p less than 0.05.

0.0832

1.8149

0.1930

Scenario IV: Regression Analysis of scenario III without Outliers
•
•

Only regression of log(beta) on constant and log(alpha/(1-alpha)) in
scenario III a contains outliers.
Outliers are determined according to criterion in MATLAB:
o If zero is outside of residual-specific confidence-interval (95%),
residual is considered an outlier.
LHS: log(alpha/(1-alpha)), RHS: constant, log(beta)

Regression Coefficients(constant, log(beta))
1.4643
0.0199
95 % Confidence Intervals
•
•

Each row contains the left and right endpoint of the 95% confidence
interval for the corresponding coefficient.
If zero is inside the confidence interval, the coefficient is not significantly
different from zero.

1.1658
-0.4268

1.7629
0.4667

Regression Statistics (R-squared, F-test, p-value for F-test)
•
•

F-test: Null hypothesis states that both regression coefficients equal zero.
Null hypothesis rejected at 95% level if p less than 0.05.

0.0005

0.0088

0.9263

